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REICHERT v. STATE EX REL. MCCULLOCH AND THE
OPEN DOOR FOR INCREASED PRE-ELECTION
SUBSTANTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW
Carina Wilmot*

I. INTRODUCTION
In Reichert v. State ex rel. McCulloch,1 the Montana Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of a legislative referendum proposing
changes to the qualification and selection of Montana Supreme Court justices. In reviewing the referendum, the Court focused on the threshold issues of ripeness and recusal before addressing its constitutionality.2 Reichert highlights the complexity of ripeness as a threshold question and clarifies when and how the Court conducts pre-election judicial review.
This note focuses only on the procedural holding of ripeness, from
which Justice Baker dissented. This note does not analyze judicial recusal
or the constitutionality or severability of the referendum provisions in question. The focus of this note is on the analysis of the strengths and limitations of the Reichert opinion, arguing that the Court confuses pre-election
judicial review of substantive challenges with pre-election review of procedural and legal sufficiency challenges. The note discusses how the Court
treats these three types of review in the same manner and, in so doing,
contravenes current statutory requirements. Ultimately, this note proposes a
new framework to distinguish between procedural, legal sufficiency, and
substantive reviews and when they should occur, which would both clarify
the Court’s role and enable the Court to follow the current statutes.
Section II discusses Reichert’s facts and background. Section III explains the Court’s holding and discusses the dissent. Section IV provides a
brief overview of related law on ripeness, Montana’s legislative processes,
defective proposed laws, and the applicability of judicial review. Section V
analyzes the Court’s holding on ripeness and pre-election judicial review in
Montana. Section V also looks at Reichert’s impact on future ripeness challenges, pre-election judicial review, and legislative considerations and suggests an alternative framework for analyzing ballot issues brought before
* Candidate for J.D. 2014, The University of Montana School of Law. The author thanks her
family for love and support, especially Evan and Karson. The author is grateful to Don Harris for his
initial and continued encouragement to write this note. Special thanks to Professor Anthony Johnstone
for his advice and input in preparing this note. Additional thanks to the Montana Law Review editors
and staff for their guidance.
1. Reichert v. State ex rel. McCulloch, 278 P.3d 455 (Mont. 2012).
2. Id. at 462–463.
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the Court. Section VI concludes the note by explaining how premature adjudication of substantive issues within a referendum could be avoided and
thereby remain consistent with Montana’s current statutes on referenda and
substantive review.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 2011, the Montana Legislature passed Senate Bill 268, submitting to
the electorate proposed revisions to Montana Code Annotated §§ 3–2–101
and 102 in regards to Montana Supreme Court justice residency requirements and elections.3 The bill was to be submitted to voters on June 5,
2012, as a special election on Legislative Referendum No. 119
(“LR–119”).4 LR–119 proposed to change the qualification and selection
of Montana Supreme Court justices by requiring the justices to be qualified
electors of the state and requiring the justices to reside in a particular district from which they would run for election.5 The proposal also included
a provision that the justices select the chief justice from amongst themselves.6
A group of citizens filed suit against the state of Montana seeking a
declaratory judgment that LR–119 was constitutionally defective.7 The
plaintiffs requested the court to decertify LR–119, thereby preventing it
from being placed on the ballot.8 The State argued the referendum was
constitutional and that the issue was not ripe for adjudication.9 Seven Montana legislators (“Legislators”) sought to intervene on behalf of the State but
were denied.10 The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on March 20, 2012, concluding that: (1) the issue was ripe for judgment; (2) LR–119 was unconstitutional on its face because it attempted to
change constitutional qualifications for Supreme Court justices and intro3. Appellees’ Response Br., Reichert v. State ex rel. McCulloch, 2012 WL 1431734 at *2 (No. DA
12-0187, 278 P.3d 455 (Apr. 10, 2012)). The Montana Constitution provides for the qualification and
selection of state Supreme Court justices. Mont. Const. art. VII, §§ 8, 9. Although district court judges
are required to reside in their districts, Supreme Court justices are merely required to be residents of
Montana for two years before taking office. Mont. Const. art. VII, § 9(1). Jurisdiction of the Montana
Supreme Court extends to all parts of the state. Mont. Const. art. VII, § 2(4). Justices are voted on in
statewide elections. Mont. Code Ann. § 3–2–101 (2011).
4. Reichert, 278 P.3d at 458.
5. Id. at 459.
6. Id.
7. Id. (The suit was filed against the state of Montana, by and through Secretary of State Linda
McCulloch).
8. Id.
9. Id. (the district court denied the Legislators’ motion to intervene; the Montana Supreme Court
dismissed an appeal of that decision; and the Montana Supreme Court denied an additional petition for
writ of supervisory control).
10. Reichert, 278 P.3d at 459.
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duced an unconstitutional residency requirement; and (3) the unconstitutional provision could not be severed from the remainder of LR–119.11
On April 4, 2012, the State requested an expedited appeal.12 The State
explained if the Court were to reverse the district court’s order, a supplemental ballot would need to be ready for mailing to voters by April 20 to
comply with state and federal deadlines for the upcoming primaries.13 The
Court expedited the briefing and invited the Legislators to file an amicus
brief.14 The Legislators filed an amicus brief, arguing that the issue was not
ripe for adjudication and that the Montana Code of Judicial Conduct indicates that all non-retiring justices of the State Supreme Court should recuse
themselves.15
III.

HOLDING

AND

DISSENT

In a majority opinion written by Justice Nelson, the Court first considered the threshold issues of recusal and ripeness before turning to the substantive issues of LR–119’s constitutionality and the severability of a provision on the referendum.16 The Court held recusal was not required by either due process or the Montana Code of Judicial Conduct.17 The Court
next determined the issue was ripe for decision because it was an issue of
law and that it was not necessary to wait for a vote on the referendum
because the hardship to the parties of withholding consideration of the issues would be great.18 Substantively, the Court held that a provision in the
referendum was an unconstitutional amendment to the State Constitution
and the constitutionally infirm provision was not severable.19
Justice Baker concurred with the majority that recusal of justices was
not required but, as the only dissenter, argued the substantive issues in the
case were not ripe for adjudication.20 She did not comment on the constitutionality of LR–119 or its severability, stating it would only be necessary to
consider those issues if the referendum passed and became law.21 Justice
Baker argued although pre-election challenges have been sparingly considered by the Court, they were only considered on issues that could be reme11. Id. at 460.
12. Id. at 461.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Amicus Br. of Seven Mont. Legislators, Reichert v. State ex rel. McCulloch, 2012 WL 1431731
at **1–2 (No. DA 12-0187, 278 P.3d 455 (Apr. 10, 2012)).
16. Reichert, 278 P.3d at 462.
17. Id. at 471.
18. Id. at 474.
19. Id. at 481, 482–483.
20. Id. at 483–484 (Baker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21. Id. at 485.
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died solely with another election.22 Justice Baker stated the Court was relying on repealed statutory authority and that this authority has been replaced
with § 13–27–316(6), which reserves the right to challenge a constitutional
defect within a proposed ballot measure only after it has been “approved by
a vote of the people.”23 Finally, she asserted if the election were to move
forward and the referendum did not pass, there would be no constitutional
issues to consider.24
IV.

DISCUSSION

OF

LAW PRIOR TO REICHERT V. STATE
MCCULLOCH

EX REL.

A. Ripeness
In order for Montana’s courts to have the power to consider a case, the
controversy needs to be justiciable.25 The concept of justiciability includes
the ripeness doctrine, which has its own set of substantive rules.26 Ripeness
analysis weighs the fitness of the issues and the hardship to the parties if
review is withheld.27 “Ripeness is concerned with whether the suit is being
brought at the proper time.”28 A case is considered ripe when it presents an
“actual, present” controversy that is not a hypothetical or speculative dispute.29 Courts’ decisions are seen as advisory opinions when they are based
on an abstract or hypothetical question.30
The United States Supreme Court has stated advisory opinions violate
the separation of powers as prescribed by the U.S. Constitution.31 However, if a law is passed and its substantive constitutionality is challenged,
citizens may not be certain about the statute’s legality and how to change
their behavior in accordance with the statute.32 In an effort to mitigate citizen uncertainty, courts may then offer advisory opinions and accelerated
judicial review.33
In Montana, there is a well-developed body of law concerning ripeness
challenges to referenda and initiatives. The Montana Supreme Court has
22. Reichert, 278 P.3d at 484.
23. Id. (citing Mont. Code. Ann. § 13–27–316).
24. Id.
25. Id. (majority).
26. Id. at 472.
27. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–149 (1967).
28. Tex. v. U.S., 497 F.3d 491, 496 (5th Cir. 2007).
29. Mont. Power Co. v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Commn., 26 P.3d 91, 95 (Mont. 2001).
30. Plan Helena, Inc. v. Helena Regl. Airport Auth. Bd., 226 P.3d 567, 569 (Mont. 2010) (citing
Chovanak v. Matthews, 188 P.2d 582, 584–585 (Mont. 1948)).
31. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96–97 (1968).
32. Michael A. Bamberger, Reckless Legislation: How Lawmakers Ignore the Constitution 168
(Rutgers U. Press 2000).
33. Id. at 168–169.
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held that pre-election review by justices “should not be routinely
granted.”34 Interference by the Court via pre-election judicial review is
only deemed acceptable when it is absolutely essential.35 The Montana Supreme Court periodically engages in substantive pre-election judicial review of referenda,36 although that type of review is not practiced by a majority of state supreme courts.37
In pre-election review, there is no presumption of constitutional validity for proposed statutes.38 Pre-election review can also occur when the
case involves a “substantive constitutional defect” or where the proposal is
unconstitutional on its face.39 Up until 2010, the Montana Supreme Court
has primarily conducted pre-election judicial review on challenges to procedural errors without having to decide substantive issues in the content of
proposed ballot measures.40
B. Montana’s Legislative Processes, Defective Proposed Laws, and
Applicability of Judicial Review
1. Bills, Initiatives, and Referenda
A bill is a proposed statute developed by a legislative body.41 When a
bill is drafted by various persons and groups, it is sent to the Legislative
Services Division (“LSD”), an independent agency containing the Legal
Services Office.42 The LSD reviews the proposed bill to ensure that it complies “with the state and federal constitutions” and that it does “not conflict
with or duplicate existing law.”43 The LSD also conducts its review on
proposed bills for conformity with the Bill Drafting Manual and makes re34. Harper v Greely, 763 P.2d 650, 656 (Mont. 1988) (citing State ex rel. Boese v. Waltermire, 730
P.2d 375, 378 (Mont. 1986)).
35. State ex rel. Mont. Citizens for Preservation of Citizens’ Rights v. Waltermire, 729 P.2d 1283,
1285 (Mont. 1986).
36. See e.g. Cobb v. State, 924 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1996); Nicholson v. Cooney, 877 P.2d 486 (Mont.
1994); Burgan & Livingstone v. Murray, 354 P.2d 552 (Mont. 1960); Walker v. State, 137 P.2d 663
(Mont. 1943).
37. James D. Gordon III & David B. Magleby, Pre-Election Judicial Review of Initiatives and
Referenda, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 298, 304 (1989).
38. Ravalli Co. v. Erickson, 85 P.3d 772, 775 (Mont. 2004).
39. Cobb, 924 P.2d at 311.
40. Anthony Johnstone, The Constitutional Initiative in Montana, 71 Mont. L. Rev. 325, 356–357
(2010).
41. See e.g. Montana Bill Drafting Manual 1 (Mont. Legis. Servs. Div. 2012), available at http://
leg.mt.gov/content/Publications/2012%20bill%20drafting%20manual.pdf (accessed Apr. 7, 2013).
42. Id.
43. Montana Legislature, Legislative Services Division, http://leg.mt.gov/css/Services%20Division/
default.asp (accessed Apr. 7, 2013); Montana Legislature, Bill Drafting Process for Legislators, http://
leg.mt.gov/css/Bills/bill-drafting-guide.asp (accessed Apr. 7, 2013).
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vision recommendations.44 However, there is no requirement that the legislature must follow the substantive recommendations of the LSD.45 There
are no additional procedures in the legislature, the executive, or the judiciary for determining facially unconstitutional bills or reviewing the substantive content of proposed bills.46
An initiative is a proposal by the people to make new law or amend the
state constitution that goes into effect after an affirmative vote by the people.47 The Montana Constitution provides for both “initiatives” and “constitutional initiatives.”48 The Montana Legislature proposed a general initiative and referendum amendment in 1906, which was passed by a wide
margin when presented to the people.49 The right of a constitutional initiative was added 66 years later to the Montana Constitution at the 1972 Constitutional Convention.50
The Montana Constitution is unique in that it allows the people of
Montana to change its laws via referenda.51 The referendum process allows
Montanans to exercise their state constitutional rights of popular sovereignty and self-government when they vote on issues.52 There are three
types of referenda: (1) “legislative referenda” proposed by the legislature
for changes or additions to existing statutes; (2) “constitutional referenda”
proposed by the legislature for changes or additions to the state constitution;
and (3) “initiated referenda” proposed by the people to reject or amend
previously enacted statutes.53 The referendum in Reichert was submitted as
a legislative referendum to propose changes to existing statutes.54
There are three ways in which the Montana Constitution may be
amended: (1) through legislative referenda; (2) through a further constitutional convention; or (3) by initiative.55 A proposed constitutional amendment referendum must receive an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the legislature before it is referred to the people.56 As a Senate bill, LR–119 did not
receive a two-thirds vote by either the Senate or the House and would not
44. Id.
45. Bill Drafting Process for Legislators, supra n. 43.
46. Id.
47. Lisa Mecklenberg Jackson, Researching Initiatives and Referenda: A Guide for Big Sky Country-Montana, 26:3-4 Legal Reference Services Quarterly 177, 178 (2008).
48. Mont. Const. art. III, § 4; Mont. Const. art. XIV, § 9.
49. M. Dane Waters, Initiative and Referendum Almanac 266 (Carolina Academic Press 2003).
50. Id.
51. Amicus Br. of Seven Mont. Legislators, supra n. 15, at *8; Mont. Const. art. III, § 5.
52. Harper, 763 P.2d at 655.
53. Mont. Const. art. III, § 5; Mont. Const. art. XIV, § 8.
54. Appellees’ Response Br., supra n. 3, at *2.
55. Mont. Const. art. XIV, § 8; Mont. Const. art. XIV, § 1; Mont. Const. art. XIV, § 9.
56. Mont. Const. art. XIV, § 8.
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have qualified as a constitutional referendum had it been so presented.57
This may explain why LR–119 was presented as a statutory revision as
opposed to a bona fide constitutional amendment.
2. Potential Defects in Ballot Issues
The Montana Supreme Court has grouped potential defects into two
arenas: procedural and substantive. After drafting, initiatives and referenda
go through one non-binding LSD review for conformity with the Bill Drafting Manual, including review for procedural and legal sufficiency issues.58
The procedural review includes formatting concerns, sufficiency of signatures, and procedural limitations set forth by statute.59 The legal sufficiency
review, defined by statute, involves review for issues such as improper appropriations, multiple subjects, conflicts with other ballot issues being
brought at the same time, and other constitutional restrictions on initiatives.60
In addition, initiatives and referenda must also meet the requirements
of Montana Code Annotated § 13–27–312, which includes a final review
for “legal sufficiency” by the Attorney General’s office.61 If the ballot issue is found to be legally deficient, the proponent has a cause of action to
challenge the decision within 10 days of the determination.62 If the ballot
issue is approved for legal sufficiency, the opponents have a cause of action
to challenge the decision within 10 days after certification is given to the
Governor that the petition is properly filed.63 However, the Attorney General’s review for legal sufficiency of a proposed issue states that “[r]eview
of the petition for legal sufficiency does not include consideration of the
substantive legality of the issue if approved by the voters.”64
3. Types of Judicial Review
There are four types of judicial review differentiated by statute: two
for pre-election review and two for post-election review. Pre-election judi57. Mont. Sen. Bill 268, Referendum to Require Election of Supreme Court Justices from Districts,
62d Legis., 2011 Reg. Sess., available at http://laws.leg.mt.gov/legprd/LAW0203W$BSRV.ActionQuery
?P_SESS=20111&P_BLTP_BILL_TYP_CD=SB&P_BILL_NO=268&P_BILL_DFT_NO=&P_CHPT_
NO=&Z_ACTION=Find&P_SBJT_SBJ_CD=&P_ENTY_ID_SEQ= (accessed Apr. 7, 2013).
58. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–202(2)(a); Mont. Code Ann. § 5–11–112; Bill Drafting Process for
Legislators, supra n. 43.
59. Mont. Code Ann. § 5–11–112; Bill Drafting Process for Legislators, supra n. 43; Mont. Code
Ann. § 13–27–103; Mont. Code Ann. § 5–4–102 (limiting the title of a bill to no more than 100 words).
60. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–312; Mont. Const. art. V, § 11(3); Mont. Const. art. III, § 4.
61. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–202(4); Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–312.
62. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–316(1).
63. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–316(2).
64. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–312(7).
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cial review is prescribed for challenges to sufficiency of the form of the
petition, the initiative’s process to get to ballot, and form of the petition.65
Review of the sufficiency of a petition is conducted pre-election and is not
allowed to be challenged after an election is held.66 The legislature has also
prescribed—and the Court has accepted jurisdiction over—pre-election review of initiatives challenged for procedural legal sufficiency stemming
from the Attorney General’s legal sufficiency determination.67 Montana
Code Annotated § 13–27–316(3) allows post-election challenges to legal
sufficiency and to the substance of an enacted law.68 To avoid unnecessary
harm when these challenges are made post-election, an injunction may be
granted.69
A few pre-Reichert challenges to the substance of a referendum highlight how the Court has handled pre-election review since Montanans ratified the 1972 Constitution. Following adoption of the 1972 Constitution,
Cobb v. State70 was the first case where the Court found that a constitutional referendum warranted pre-election substantive judicial review.71 The
constitutional referendum at issue in Cobb sought to eliminate the office of
the Montana Secretary of State.72 The referendum delegated duties of the
Secretary of State to other state offices but left one duty identified in the
1972 Constitution unassigned.73 The Court found the one unassigned duty
would leave a “substantive constitutional defect” that could only be cured
by another election, and the proposed referendum was therefore held unconstitutional.74
Pre-election judicial review of the substance of a legislative referendum was also found ripe for decision in Nicholson v. Cooney.75 The referendum at issue was an income tax measure to raise minimum corporate
taxes. Plaintiffs challenged the referendum by asserting that Article VIII,
section 9 of the Montana Constitution limits the people to make appropriations that will exceed anticipated revenue.76 The Court found the limit did
not apply to the people who would be making the appropriation via a refer65. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–317.
66. Mont. Const. art. III, § 4(3).
67. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–316(3); see State ex rel. Livingston v. Murray, 354 P.2d 552,
553–554 (Mont. 1960).
68. Mont. Code Ann. § 27–8–201.
69. Mont. Code Ann. § 27–19–201.
70. Cobb, 924 P.2d 268.
71. Id. at 270–271.
72. Id. at 268.
73. Id. at 270.
74. Id.
75. Nicholson, 877 P.2d 486.
76. Id. at 490–491 (citing Mont. Const. art. VIII, § 9).
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endum but rather to the legislature.77 The Court held the referendum was
not unconstitutional on its face.78
The Court also rejected a substantive challenge to an initiative in State
ex rel. Montana School Board Association v. Waltermire.79 At issue was a
tax initiative to limit the establishment or increase of sales tax or personal
income tax to those brought by legislative referendum and approved by a
vote of the people.80 Plaintiffs challenged the initiative by asserting it was
in violation of Article XIV, section 11 of the Montana Constitution, which
requires that initiatives present only one amendment in a single ballot measure.81 The Court declined to consider whether the initiative was unconstitutional for addressing more than one subject.82 The Court stated that considering ballot issues that were not unconstitutional on their face would be
an “unjustified infringement” on the right of the people to present initiatives.83 The Court further clarified that pre-election review may occur only
when an initiative is unconstitutional on its face (for example, when it contradicts a constitutional provision).84
V.

ANALYSIS

Ripeness was a threshold issue for the Reichert Court. Plaintiff citizens challenged the substantive, not procedural, constitutionality of
LR–119.85 The issue of ripeness was raised by both the Legislators and the
appellant.86 The Legislators argued in their amicus brief that there was no
substantial risk of significant irreparable harm in waiting to adjudicate the
case until LR–119 was passed.87 The State also wanted the Court to wait
until after the referendum was voted on because the referendum might
never become law, and there was not a specific statute vesting a Montana
court with jurisdiction over legislative referenda.88 The remainder of this
note will analyze four issues: (A) whether the facts and circumstances rendered the case ripe; (B) the interplay between pre-election judicial review
for bills, referenda, and initiatives; (C) what Reichert might mean for future
77. Id.
78. Id. at 487, 491.
79. State ex rel. Mont. Sch. Bd. Assn. v Waltermire, 729 P.2d 1297 (Mont. 1986).
80. Id. at 1298.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1299–1300.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Reichert, 278 P.3d at 459.
86. Id.; Amicus Br. of Seven Mont. Legislators, supra n. 15, at *2.
87. Amicus Br. of Seven Mont. Legislators, supra n. 15, at **4–5.
88. Br. of Appellant, Reichert v. State ex rel. McCulloch, 2012 WL 1313628 at **7–10 (No. DA
12-0187, 278 P.3d 455 (Apr. 6, 2012)).
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ripeness challenges and pre-election judicial review; and (D) a proposed
framework the Court could rely on for determining when to hear challenges
to ballot issues.
A. Ripeness
In Reichert, the Court conducted a ripeness analysis, weighing the fitness of the issues and the hardship to the parties if review were to be withheld.89 The Court analyzed fitness according to whether the referendum
was unconstitutional on its face and analyzed hardship by assessing the impact on the parties of deferring a decision.90 The Court reviewed Montana
case law and reaffirmed that a court has a duty to determine whether an
initiative is unconstitutional on its face.91 The Court clarified it had a “duty
to exercise jurisdiction” when a challenged measure is facially defective.92
In essence, the Court looked to the substance of a challenged measure as
part of the process of assuming jurisdiction. Declaratory judgments related
to ballot issues where there is a justiciable controversy give rise to jurisdiction.93 Therefore, if the Court were to determine that a measure is facially
unconstitutional, it would have jurisdiction. If the measure is not facially
unconstitutional, the Court would not have jurisdiction.
The Court spent considerable time exploring the potential hardship to
the parties if the decision were to be withheld. The majority effectively
expanded the definition of “extraordinary” pre-election review to include
considerations of time, energy and money in its hardship analysis.94 The
dissent argued in response that the hardship was insufficient to outweigh the
people’s right to vote, even though withholding consideration might make
“the process tortuous and more costly than necessary.”95
The dissent properly argued that the majority relied on a case decided
on the basis of a repealed statute.96 The majority opinion relied on a series
of Montana decisions, but focused on the holding in Cobb, where the Court
affirmed an injunction preventing a facially unconstitutional referendum
from being placed on the ballot.97 In Cobb, the Court looked at the substance of the referendum to determine its facial validity.98 The dissent discussed the repealed statute on which Cobb was based and argued that, pur89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Reichert, 278 P.3d at 472.
Id.
Id. at 473–474.
Id.
State Bar of Mont. v. Krivec, 632 P.2d 707, 709 (Mont. 1981).
Reichert, 278 P.3d at 474.
Id. at 485 (Baker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 484.
Id. at 474 (majority) (citing Cobb, 924 P.2d at 270).
Id. at 484 (Baker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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suant to the current statute, § 13–27–316(6), the legislature had preserved
substantive constitutional challenges to referenda only after they have been
voted on by the people.99 The majority did not address the dissent’s concern about Cobb’s reliance on a repealed statute, nor did the majority address the mandates of the current statute.
Section 13–27–316 provides the only statutory grounds for challenging a ballot measure’s legal sufficiency determination prior to a vote by the
people on the measure. The statute excludes review of the substantive legality, but preserves “the right to challenge a constitutional defect in the
substance of an issue approved by a vote of the people.”100 In conducting
pre-election review of the substantive legality of LR–119, an issue outside
the scope of the legal sufficiency challenge permitted by § 13–27–316, the
Court acted contrary to the mandates of the statute.
The Court also did not adhere to the principle of the separation of
powers of the state government into the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches.101 While the power of the judiciary is an “important safeguard
against abuses of legislative and executive power,”102 separation of powers
argues against the Court assuming the power to review referenda that are
not yet law.103 In Reichert, the Court held the legislative branch created a
referendum with unconstitutional elements.104 The Montana Constitution
does not require a legislative referendum be declared constitutional before it
is submitted to the voters and ratified into law.105 It is up to the Court, and
no other branch of the tripartite system in Montana, to determine a law’s
constitutionality. However, the Court, in assuming the power to conduct
pre-election review contrary to statute, is overstepping its role in the tripartite system.
The majority in Reichert may have offered accelerated judicial review,
in part, to clear up citizens’ potential uncertainty on how heavily to rely on
passed laws. There is a presumption of constitutionality for fully enacted
laws.106 However, even if a law is effective immediately, Montana’s in99. Id.
100. Reichert, 278 P.3d at 484; Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–316 (emphasis added). See also Mont.
Code Ann. § 13–27–312(7) (“Review of the petition for legal sufficiency does not include consideration
of the substantive legality of the issue if approved by the voters.”).
101. Mont. Const. art. III, § 1.
102. James C. Nelson, Keeping Faith with the Vision: Interpreting a Constitution for This and Future Generations, 71 Mont. L. Rev. 299, 307 (2010).
103. Amicus Br. of Seven Montana Legislators, supra n. 15, at *3.
104. Reichert, 278 P.3d at 478 (majority).
105. Mont. Const. art. XIV, § 9 (This section of the Constitution governs amendments to the Constitution by initiative, and there is no indication that the legislature is responsible for only submitting
“substantively constitutional” initiatives.); Mont. Const. art. III, § 5 (“The people may approve or reject
by referendum any act of the legislature except an appropriation of money.” (emphasis added)).
106. Davis v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 937 P.2d 27, 31 (Mont. 1997).
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junctive relief statutes provide a mechanism to enjoin enforcement of a law
pending a constitutional challenge.107 The Court may have been trying to
maximize its power and flexibility by opening the door to increased preelection judicial review. However, increased pre-election judicial review
raises the issues of whether the judiciary is issuing advisory opinions and
whether it is acting paternalistically by asserting itself between the legislature and the people, thereby limiting the ability of the people to have a
voice in the direction they want the laws of their state to go.
B. The Interplay between Bills, Initiatives, and Referenda in Montana
Bills, initiatives, and referenda proposals in Montana are all required
to go through legal sufficiency reviews.108 The reviews are similar for all
three types of proposals as they are all based on the requirements set forth
in the Montana Legislature’s Bill Drafting Manual.109 Both initiatives and
referenda go through a non-binding substantive review by the LSD.110 One
can argue that referenda should be treated more like bills and given greater
deference in the form of a less-stringent substantive review because the
legislature goes through an extensive drafting and review process in creating proposals. On the other hand, since referenda do not go into effect
unless approved by a vote of the people and can be subject to direct judicial
challenges, it can also be argued that referenda should continue to be treated
similar to initiatives and subject to a more stringent review.
Even with two legal sufficiency reviews of initiatives and referenda
done first by the LSD and second by the Attorney General’s office, the
Court has reviewed numerous ballot challenges for procedural insufficiency
both pre-election and post-election.111 Precedent makes clear that challenges to procedural sufficiency may not be questioned after an election.112
“[C]hallenges to election procedures should be made before the election
occurs.”113 Since election procedure cannot be questioned after an election
occurs, substance of referenda should not be questioned before they become
law. The substance of a petition should not be looked at pre-election, as the
107. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 27–19–101 et seq.
108. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–202; Bill Drafting Process for Legislators, supra n. 43.
109. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–202.
110. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–312(7) (referencing the binding review of the Attorney General’s
office). There are no statutes providing a cause of action based on LSD reviews, indicating that the LSD
reviews are non-binding.
111. See e.g. State ex rel. Harper v. Waltermire, 691 P.2d 826 (Mont. 1984); State ex rel. Mont.
Citizens for Preservation of Citizens’ Rights, 729 P.2d at 1283.
112. Montanans for Equal Application of Initiative Laws v. State ex rel. Johnson, 154 P.3d 1202,
1212 (Mont. 2007); Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–312(7) (applies to proposed ballot statements and therefore to both initiatives and referenda).
113. Mont. Chamber of Com. v. Argenbright, 226 F.3d 1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 2000).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol74/iss2/9

12

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\74-2\MON202.txt

unknown

Seq: 13

17-JUN-13

10:24

Wilmot: Reichert v. State ex rel. McCulloch and the Open Door for Increas

2013

PRE-ELECTION SUBSTANTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW

453

petition is not yet enacted into law, because it may not pass by a vote of the
people. Some courts have found that because courts are powerless to review the substance of bills, they also do not have the power to review the
substance of ballot issues.114 Montana should follow these courts and only
look at the substance of ballot issues after they become law.
Timing challenges arise “because the initiative process must balance
responsiveness to petitioners in an election year against allowing sufficient
time to process and publish amendments before balloting.”115 The Reichert
majority seemingly agreed with this timing concern when it considered the
hardship of the “consum[ption of] resources,” specifically in regard to saving taxpayer money and time.116 The majority stated that placing a facially
invalid ballot in front of voters creates a “sham out of the voting process.”117
C. Reichert’s Impact
Since the Reichert decision, two cases have shown the impact of the
Court’s ripeness analysis. In MEA-MFT v. McCulloch,118 a legislative referendum that would provide a tax credit and potential tax refund in years of
a projected surplus was declared facially unconstitutional for violation of
separation of powers.119 The Court justified a substantive pre-election review under the Reichert hardship analysis, again focusing on the wasteful
consumption of resources that would result from allowing a defective measure to proceed to voters.120 The Court’s heavy reliance on Reichert shows
that “extraordinary” pre-election judicial review now clearly includes consideration of the potential waste of time and money. This reaffirms Reichert’s expansion of constitutional review beyond Cobb’s holding, where the
Court said a ballot issue can be enjoined if it creates a constitutional defect
“which could not be remedied except by another election.”121 The Court
has not yet clearly defined the amount of resources to be consumed that
justify a hardship, which it could have done if, for example, it had detailed
the minimum amounts of time and money to qualify for a hardship.
Justice Baker dissented in MEA-MFT and was also joined by Justices
Rice and Cotter.122 The dissenters did not find this case extraordinary, at
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Tilson v. Mofford, 737 P.2d 1367, 1369 (Ariz. 1987).
Johnstone, supra n. 40, at 362.
Reichert, 278 P.3d at 474.
Id.
MEA-MFT v. McCulloch, 291 P.3d 1075 (Mont. 2012).
Id. at 1080–1081.
Id. at 1079.
Cobb, 924 P.2d at 269.
MEA-MFT, 291 P.3d at 1082 (Baker, Rice & Cotter, JJ., dissenting).
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least in part because the new law would not take effect until almost two
months after a vote by the people.123 The dissenters also argued the issue
was not ripe for adjudication because, in their view, deciding a case on
substantive merits before a vote by the people constitutes deciding the validity of a proposed law.124
In Montanans Opposed to I–166 v. Bullock,125 the Court clarified that
legal sufficiency review does not include the power to substantively review
ballot issues.126 Justice Baker concurred with the majority, stating that “the
statutes now reflect a clear preference to defer ruling on the constitutionality of a proposed initiative petition until after the results of the election at
which it is submitted to the voters.”127 Montanans Opposed to I–166 is
distinguishable from Reichert because I–166 was an initiative and the cause
of action was solely based on § 13–27–316(2), which allows opponents to
challenge the Attorney General’s approval of legal sufficiency without
seeking other relief such as a declaratory judgment.128 The Court therefore
restrained its focus to the Attorney General’s legal sufficiency review.129
Justice Nelson’s dissent argued that the majority wrongly differentiated between a legal sufficiency review and a substantive review.130 He also argued the measure was facially unconstitutional and would not pass a legal
sufficiency review because a citizen initiative cannot enact a policy, only
laws.131 Justice Nelson suggests that in challenges to legal sufficiency, the
Court should analyze whether the challenged initiative is facially unconstitutional. However, Justice Nelson refers to the referendum in Reichert as
facially unconstitutional without answering the question of whether the
Court should either limit its review to legal sufficiency because of
§ 13–27–316(2) or expand its review to address the substance of the measure.
Regardless of how the Court decides to analyze future ballot issues,
the Reichert decision will likely affect how the Legislature handles future
referenda. It is clear the Legislature and Court disagree about what is and is
not constitutional and that a majority of the current Justices have declined
to adopt Justice Baker’s deference to the statutory limitations imposed by
§ 13–27–316. One effect of an increased ability of the judiciary to conduct
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 1081.
Id. at 1082.
Montanans Opposed to I–166 v. Bullock, 285 P.3d 435 (Mont. 2012).
Id. at 436.
Id. at 437 (Baker, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 436 (majority); Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–316(2).
Montanans Opposed to I–166, 285 P.3d at 436.
Id. at 444 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
Id.
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pre-election review may be to invite more proposals to directly modify
Montana’s 1972 Constitution.
Reichert may also cause the Legislature to review and revise statutes
concerning pre-election review for substantive issues within referenda and
initiatives. Revisions of the statute could come in various forms: by clarifying when substantive review should occur rather than only focusing statutes
on legal sufficiency review; by clarifying that judicial pre-election review is
not to occur for substantive challenges, or alternatively, allowing pre-election causes of action challenging the substance of a ballot issue; by distinguishing between the types of challenges (procedural sufficiency, legal sufficiency, and substantive constitutionality); and/or by defining “case,” “controversy,” and “law” to help courts avoid issuing advisory or policy
opinions.
D. Proposed Framework for Future Challenges
Although it is not within the Court’s purview to become involved with
the politics surrounding referenda, the Court may be able to distinguish between the three different types of review: pre-election procedural sufficiency review, pre- or post-election legal sufficiency review, and post-election substantive review. While Reichert focused on the substance of the
measure, the Court relied heavily on Cobb without distinguishing it as a
review for legal sufficiency.
One potential approach to address a referendum’s potential defect(s) is
for the Court to differentiate challenges to procedural sufficiency, legal sufficiency, and substantive constitutionality. The procedural challenges, following Montana law, could continue to be made pre-election to avoid mootness issues.132 Even if struck down by the Court, defects in procedural
sufficiency might be remedied and brought again to ballot by following
proper procedure. Procedural defects are similar across ballot issues regardless of the content of the challenged measure. For example, if a proposed constitutional amendment was challenged and struck down for improper publication, the amendment could be brought again to the people,
provided that the measure was published in full twice each month for two
months before the election.133 Defining the review as procedural sufficiency would make it clear the defects could be remedied and the measure
could be proposed again with necessary adjustments. The Court could also
conduct a ripeness analysis for this type of review to ensure it would be
considered at the proper time.
132. Mont. Const. art. III, § 4(3). See e.g. Montanans for Equal Application of Initiative Laws, 154
P.3d 1202; Mont. Chamber of Com., 226 F.3d at 1052.
133. Mont. Code Ann. § 13–27–311.
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The Court could redefine the current facial constitutionality review to
be a pre- or post-election legal sufficiency review. “Legal sufficiency” review would include review as currently defined by the Constitution and
statutes. Legal sufficiency review could be done either pre- or post-election. This review would fall within the confines of how the Court defines
“facially unconstitutional” review, as articulated by Justice Nelson in
Montanans Opposed to I–166, and it would include violations such as the
single-subject and single-amendment rules.134
Cobb has clearly set the standard for pre-election analysis of constitutional referenda where, consistent with the ripeness doctrine, the Court can
review for a facial defect. Review for facial deficiency under Cobb includes ensuring a constitutional referendum and proposed ballot issue address every element of the constitution it attempts to amend and striking
down proposed amendments with defects that could only be remedied by
another election. Review for facial deficiency would be similar across ballot issues, regardless of content of the challenged measure. Similar to a
procedurally insufficient measure, a legally insufficient measure could be
remedied and proposed again. The Court can limit its legal sufficiency review in such a way that would allow it to still hear a pre-election cause of
action related to “legal sufficiency” and stay within statutory limitations by
not conducting a broader substantive review.
Although the Court currently reviews all substantive considerations of
statutory referenda to determine if they are “facially unconstitutional,” the
third type of review would be a post-election substantive review. There are
various reasons why it is preferable to wait until after a proposal is enacted
before conducting a substantive review. Post-election substantive reviews
are viable for statutes that are challenged for constitutional defects, regardless of whether the statutes were enacted by a bill, initiative, or referendum.
Examples of such defects would include contradictions to the Constitution
because of a violation of separation of powers (MEA-MFT) or violations to
the Constitution (Reichert). Here, the Court could identify the specific defects as substantively constitutional or unconstitutional, and the measures
would not be able to be brought again, even with revisions, because they are
unconstitutional on their merits. No ripeness analysis would be necessary
as a post-election-only analysis would keep the judiciary within its role of
hearing challenges only to enacted law and not allow the judiciary to offer
advisory opinions.
134. Mont. Const. art. V, § 11(3) (requiring that each bill can only contain one subject); Mont.
Const. art. XIV, § 11 (requiring that if more than one constitutional amendment is to be submitted at the
same election, each amendment needs to be voted on separately). See e.g. Marshall v. State ex rel.
Cooney, 975 P.2d 325 (Mont. 1999).
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V. CONCLUSION
Reichert exemplifies the complexity and importance of ripeness questions and presents an unresolved issue as to how and when pre-election
judicial review should occur. The Court focused on the threshold issue of
ripeness prior to deciding the substantive issues of the case. The Court did
not properly analyze the referendum within the ripeness doctrine because
LR–119 was being challenged for its substance, not for procedural or legal
sufficiency. By relying on Cobb, the Court did not properly support its
ripeness argument as Cobb was based on a repealed statute allowing for
pre-election substantive review. The Reichert Court did not address the dissent’s concerns about the lack of supporting precedent for pre-election judicial review on the substance of a ballot issue or about those Montana statutes that clearly state that a substantive review does not fall within the purview of a legal sufficiency review. Moreover, the Court has improperly
grouped legal sufficiency reviews with substantive constitutionality reviews
for purposes of conducting pre-election review of a ballot issue.
Reichert highlights a gap in Montana’s statutes in terms of how the
judicial system can determine whether a referendum is constitutional before
it is voted on, passed, and thereby presumed constitutional. Although statutes are in place to treat referenda similar to initiatives for purposes of legal
sufficiency review, there are no statutes in place for substantive judicial
review of referenda. Due to the lack of statutes discussing when substantive review is to be conducted, Reichert opens the door to increased preelection judicial review. The Court needs to further clarify between judicial
legal sufficiency review and substantive constitutionality review, as well as
when the two types of review can occur.
From Reichert one can infer the Court is carving a new avenue for preelection judicial review of legislative referenda by including a hardship
analysis based on the consumption of resources when deciding if a case or
controversy is “extraordinary.” However, the analysis of hardship based on
the consumption of resources will likely be susceptible to political manipulation. There is no bright line of when consumption of resource factors
such as potential waste of time, waste of money, and citizen uncertainty
would trigger the “extraordinary” pre-election judicial review of a referendum.
The Reichert majority stated that allowing facially unconstitutional
ballot measures to proceed to an election would create a “sham out of the
voting process.”135 Nevertheless, the Court needs to stay within the confines of judicial power under the separation of powers doctrine. The Court
135. Reichert, 278 P.3d at 474.
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is setting dangerous precedent by overstepping the boundaries of judicial
power. Ultimately, Reichert may be inconsistent with the ripeness doctrine
because the Court should not conduct pre-election substantive review unrelated to procedure or legal sufficiency. Proponents of ballot measures and
voters are in need of clear legislation or a clear decision from the Court
differentiating between the various judicial reviews and when they can
occur.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol74/iss2/9

18

